The Battle of Verdun 1916

I. The strategy of Erich von Falkenhayn

On 14 September 1914, after it has become clear that the Schlieffen Plan has failed, Helmuth von Moltke the Younger is relieved as Chief of the General Staff and replaced by Erich von Falkenhayn. From that day until 28 August 1916, this thoroughly dynamic general will direct the fortunes of the German field army. Falkenhayn sees that a quick end to the war can no longer be expected. He is fully aware of the numerical superiority of the Allies, which grows from day to day. He quite rightly recognises Russia as the weaker part of the Entente, and he knows that as long as Germany is fighting on 2 fronts, the decision of the war cannot be forced in the West with the limited means available. But the strategy and the manner of conducting the fighting that this general will practise over the next 2 years run strictly counter to his own insights and can often only be described as pure wishful thinking. This begins as early as the German offensives in Flanders in October and November 1914, when the front had long since become bogged down. Here one fresh reserve corps after another is ruthlessly burnt up, merely to take the 2 Channel ports of Calais and Dunkirk, which might have been of tactical but certainly not of war-deciding importance. Through this useless "battling about", strong German forces are worn down which in the meantime could have inflicted a debacle on the Russian field army in the East on a uniquely favourable occasion. Before turning to the East, Falkenhayn is determined first to "wear down" the forces of the Western Allies. In the war year 1915 the Central Powers achieve considerable successes in the East, while in the West, apart from the attack at Ypres in April, they remain on the defensive. But even on the defensive, Falkenhayn's measures run counter to the awareness of numerical inferiority and the imperative of conserving forces. Regardless of losses, every position, every stretch of trench is stubbornly defended to the last, even if the position is unfavourably located or the tactical situation calls for a withdrawal. For this purpose the German forces are massed in the 1st line, while the reserves in depth are often insufficient and are released only at the last moment. The bulk of the German troops is thus within range of the Allied artillery from the outset. No one can bring himself to allow subordinate commanders to make limited withdrawals, for fear of encouraging the troops to "run away".

As a result, the defence often suffers unnecessarily high losses. Finally, the war year 1916 gives birth to the most questionable offspring of Falkenhayn's strategy: the "battle of attrition" (literally, the battle to bleed the enemy white) at Verdun. Here the commander plans a long-drawn-out battle of attrition against the French. Through many attacks conducted with a fairly small commitment of infantry, each prepared by a tremendous artillery bombardment, he wants to lure strong French forces to Verdun. At first he does not necessarily intend to take Verdun (unlike the army command entrusted with carrying out the attack), but wants to occupy a favourable position on the heights of the east bank quickly, against which the French would then launch costly counter-attacks. The German attack is conducted with narrowly set daily objectives, without exploiting favourable opportunities and without great haste. Thus, 4 days after the start of the attack, the German troops are only just at the edge of the actual ring of fortifications. Meanwhile, French reinforcements roll into Verdun without interruption. That the enemy has far more men and materiel at his disposal on the Western Front than the Germans, and that the German troops will soon have to attack, without fixed positions, an enemy of equal or greater strength who holds most of the fortifications while the German troops lie in the shell-crater field, does not seem to have shaken Falkenhayn in his logic. He firmly expects that in this way the Germans will succeed in inflicting losses on the enemy at a ratio of 3:1. Operation "Gericht" (Judgement), as the attack was called, is neither one thing nor the other, with too small a commitment of forces and the restriction of the attack to the east bank of the river. Many historians are of the opinion that a major attack on both banks early on would have made it possible to take a large part of the fortress area. French counter-attacks would then in all probability have followed, with a more favourable ratio of losses. When it is realised that things are not going according to plan – Falkenhayn estimating the French losses much higher than they actually are – it is long too late: events have developed their own dynamic. Because of the prestige the French attach to the defence of Verdun, the Germans now absolutely must achieve a success after all, that is, the capture of Verdun. And so, on both sides, the best battalions of Germany and France burn out to slag. When the British then attack on the Somme at the end of June, the Russians have already begun their Brusilov offensive against the Central Powers at the beginning of the month, and Romania joins the Entente in August, the crisis is complete.
Nevertheless, Falkenhayn's intention of attacking at Verdun at the beginning of 1916 cannot be condemned in principle. At the beginning of 1916 France had weakened this sector of the front in the most reckless manner. Considering the crises of the French defenders in the first days of the battle, it seems obvious that with a larger commitment of forces, an attack on both sides of the river and the energetic exploitation of the breakthroughs achieved, it would have been possible to occupy a large part of the fortress area. Had the Germans then, in possession of most of the forts, gone over to the defensive and waited for the French counter-attacks that would certainly have followed, they would probably have achieved a much more favourable ratio of losses, or at least have tied down strong French forces in front of Verdun, which would then have been lacking for the planned Allied offensive on the Somme. Understood as a strategic diversion, this offensive would thus have made perfect sense. As things turned out, however, from the German point of view the Battle of Verdun can probably only be regarded as the bankruptcy of Falkenhayn's conduct of the war.

II. Operation Gericht

In mid-December 1915, Falkenhayn submits a memorandum to the Kaiser in which he explains that the German forces in the West are not sufficient for a breakthrough followed by a war of movement. He therefore plans, through a limited offensive with little infantry and a strong commitment of artillery, to "bleed white" the French army in 1916 and thus to rob England of its "sword on the Continent". At first he considers Belfort for this, but then decides on Verdun. Indeed, the Verdun sector is in some respects well suited to a German offensive. True, Verdun is a fortress with 20 main and 40 intermediate works, and the terrain is heavily wooded and broken. But because of the calm on this sector of the front, the French have weakened it considerably. In 1915 the French withdrew 43 heavy and 11 light batteries from here to support other sectors, and only the first field position has been completed, while the 2nd and 3rd lines have only been partly built. French intelligence does come up with reports of a German offensive, but the French high command believes it will take place in Champagne. The German 5th Army under the command of the German Crown Prince and his chief of staff Knobelsdorf is assigned to carry out the attack. The date of the attack is to be 12 February. For the time being, however, Falkenhayn limits the attack to the right bank of the Meuse and keeps control of the reserves for himself. 10 divisions are earmarked for this thrust; in the northern sector, 6 ½ divisions with 858 guns stand on a 13 km front. Facing them are 3 French divisions with 263 guns. In total, the German artillery musters 1,125 guns and 150 mortars on the Verdun front, 33 of them of more than 30.5 cm calibre. 2.5 million rounds are ready for the first days. On 12 February, however, it starts to rain and the German attack has to be postponed until 21 February. The French, who have meanwhile become suspicious, move 4 reserve divisions behind the Verdun front. At 8.12 a.m. on 21 February, the Battle of Verdun begins with the German drumfire. By 5 p.m. the German batteries hurl about 1 million high-explosive and gas shells onto the French positions. Then 18 German infantry regiments go into the attack. In places they advance up to 3 km without meeting the slightest resistance, but in the Bois des Caures the German attackers come up against desperate resistance. Here the French Lieutenant-Colonel Driant defends himself with his chasseurs. Elsewhere, however, many field-grey soldiers wonder why they are not allowed to continue attacking in the evening. Why not push on further at the points where French resistance is wavering? Because it does not fit Falkenhayn's concept. The next day the German artillery drums from 8 to 12 o'clock. Only then do the Germans attack again. In the Herbebois, the Bois de Wavrille and the Bois des Caures, the French defence is still stubborn, but a day later resistance here dies out. On these and the following days, the German artillery barrage begins at 10 o'clock sharp each time, and only towards evening does the infantry go into the attack. On 25 February the German spearheads finally lie in front of the actual ring of fortifications. On this day Fort Douaumont falls to a coup de main by First Lieutenant von Brandis with 100 men of the 24th Brandenburg Infantry Regiment. Instead of the standard garrison of 500 men, there were only 70 territorial troops in the fort. Significantly, this coup succeeded contrary to the order to advance only as far as just in front of the fort. The French regard this 25 February as the most critical day of the entire battle, since the defence was on the verge of collapse for lack of reserves. But this is not exploited. And so the French defence grows strong again. Until 2 March bitter fighting rages for the village of Douaumont; then the Germans finally take it. Now the German side plans to attack on the left bank as well, since French flanking fire from there is making itself unpleasantly felt. On 6 March the Germans attack on both wings; on the right, Fort Vaux becomes the focal point of the battle, on the left the height of the "Mort-Homme" (Dead Man). General Pétain, who has meanwhile been appointed commander of the French troops at Verdun, has in the meantime received substantial reinforcements. By 28 February alone, the French have brought up 7 ½ divisions and 300 heavy guns via the "Voie Sacrée", the "Sacred Way" from Verdun to Bar-le-Duc. By mid-1916 the French are using up to 12,000 lorries for supplies. The entire German army in the West does not have that many. The Germans do not take the "Mort-Homme" until 20 May. The artillery of both sides shoots the summit down from 295 m to 279 m. On the east bank the Germans try to make gradual progress through constant small attacks. By June, however, they gain only 1 km. On 2 June the Germans succeed in penetrating the armoured Fort Vaux. But only on 7 June do the last defenders surrender after horrific fighting inside the fort. Between 23 and 26 June the Germans take the village of Fleury and the Ouvrage de Thiaumont. They now stand 4 km from Verdun. The start of the Somme offensive forces the withdrawal of German forces.
In the period from 21 February to 21 May, the Germans lose 174,215 men, the French 190,000. In this period the French artillery fires 9,795,000 rounds, the German artillery over 10,000,000 rounds.
On 11 July the Germans make one last desperate frontal attack on the east bank on a 4 km front. On 12 July they stand in front of Fort Souville. Here the attack finally collapses, 2.5 km from Verdun. The crises on other fronts force the attack to be broken off, and the Germans go over to the defensive. The French conduct constant small counter-attacks until October. The outbreak of war with Romania on 28 August leads to Falkenhayn's dismissal and the further withdrawal of German forces from Verdun. On 2 September the Supreme Army Command (OHL) orders the final cessation of the attack on Verdun. The French now prepare a major attack.
By 1 September the Germans have lost 281,333 men. The French have lost 315,000. On the German side, a withdrawal to the well-built starting positions of 21 February would have been called for. But they cannot bring themselves to give up this ground, conquered with hecatombs of men. On 24 October Pétain begins his great counter-attack. The French push forward as far as Douaumont. The 28 German defenders of the fort lay down their arms. Fort Vaux is evacuated without a fight on 1 November and occupied by the French 2 days later. On 15 December General Nivelle, who has meanwhile been appointed commander, attacks once more between the Meuse and the Woëvre plain. The Germans are pushed back into the Bois des Fosses and the Bois des Chaume. In the period from 1 September to 20 December, the Germans lose 52,498 soldiers. The French lose 47,000 men. The battle is over. Within the thirty main weeks of fighting, the German artillery fired 1,350,000 t of shells at Verdun. That corresponds to the load of 2,700 trains, each with 50 wagons plus a locomotive and 1 tender. Each such train would be about 480 m long. If these trains were lined up directly one behind the other, train after train, they would block a route from Cologne via Berlin to 100 km beyond Warsaw. One thousand two hundred and eighty kilometres, nothing but train after train! And this was only the ammunition used by the German artillery; that of the French artillery was correspondingly large. And this storm of steel came down on an area of about 26,000 hectares. After the battle, about 50 t of steel splinters lay in and on the earth per hectare. During excavations, dead soldiers were found whom the drumfire had buried up to 10 m deep. In total, about 40 million shells came down on the battlefield. Calculated over 30 weeks, that makes about 190,000 per day, or about 8,000 per hour.
About 150,000 German and about 167,000 French soldiers were shot, torn to pieces, burnt, buried alive or gassed at Verdun; about 187,000 Germans and about 210,000 Frenchmen were wounded. Today one can hardly comprehend the suffering of the soldiers in field grey and horizon blue. Weeks on end in the muddy crater field strewn with corpses and body parts, weeks on end the roar of the shells, weeks on end the stench of decay, against which some soldiers stuffed cloves of garlic into their noses, weeks on end the merciless fighting and the corpse rats, gorged to bursting!
An eternal warning against war and genocide…